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Inflation Targeting (IT) is one of the operational frameworks for monetary policy aimed at 
attaining price stability. Goodhart’s (2009) law states that any observed statistical regularity 
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. Central banks 
behave accordingly to their monetary regime, which all have policy goals. In recent decades, 
there has been widespread interest in shifting from a discretion-based to a rules-based 
monetary policy frameworks. The inflation targeting regime has a wide pro and critical 
professional literature. We all know, that inflation is a serious disease, but the role of the 
anti-inflatory policy is questioned by several economists, who advise that the monetary 
policies might focus on unemployment rate or the increase of GDP. The questions raised in 
my paper that: Is IT an exclusive monetary regime? Is IT the most successful equipment to 
reach price stability? Are the central banks the one and only responsible actors regarding 
the inflation rate? I am focusing in the second part of my paper to the Hungarian monetary 
policy regimes. Does price stability should be the ultimate goal for a monetary framework in 
Hungary? I think this paper is actual, because in Hungary there has been inflation targeting 
monetary framework since 2001 due to what I suppose the international financial crisis hit 
the country more severe than it should.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been widespread interest in shifting from a discretion-
based to a rules-based monetary policy frameworks world ide (see Benati-Goodhart 
2008).  
The inflation targeting (IT) regime was introduced to eliminate the inflation 
bias, very soon many countries have adopted that regime, meanwhile in Hungary 
János Kornai (1983) listed seven different main diseases1 which attacks the wealth 
                                                   
 
1Inflation, unemployment, shortage, high level of external indebtedness, growth problems, inequality, 
bureaucratism. 
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of national economies. Among these diseases there ar  m ny trade-offs. In order to 
reduce the symptoms and complications of one disease, or even be successful in 
treating it, we are responsible for increase one oth r disease. There is no panacea. 
That is almost impossible to be full healthy, the non-healthy condition remains. Al-
most everyone agrees on that the inflation can be harmful2 to the society3, let me re-
fer to that expressions: inflation is the tax of the poor’s. The main reasons for the in-
flation are the imbalances between the actual supply and demand. “Inflation harms 
the economy via two interrelated channels. The level of inflation, on the one hand, 
and inflation uncertainty, i.e. erratic changes in prices, on the other, may induce 
costs, thereby reducing social welfare (Kiss–Krekó 2004, p. 7.)”. If we analyze the 
global inflation between 1990 and 2013 (Table 1) we might think that the golden era 
of decreasing and reaching a constant low inflation has been arrived. In the econom-
ic history that is a unique process when the inflation went down so fast. Neverthe-
less this is only a precondition of sustainable price stability, because long-term price 
stability depends less and less on domestic monetary policy.  
Table 1. Inflation, average consumer prices 
Geo – time 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
World 17,9% 15,3% 27,7% 14,4% 4,6% 3,8% 3,6% 3,8% 
Advanced economies 13,7% 5,4% 5,1% 2,6% 2,3% 2,3% 1,5% 1,4% 
Euro area  n/a n/a n/a 2,4% 2,2% 2,2% 1,6% 1,5% 
Major advanced economies (G7) 12,4% 3,8% 4,7% 2,2% 2,2% 2,4% 1,4% 1,3% 
European Union 12,6% 6,1% 27,5% 5,0% 3,1% 2,3% 2,0% 1,7% 
Emerging market and develop-
ing economies n/a n/a 98,7% 39,0% 8,6% 5,9% 5,9% 6,2% 
Central and eastern Europe 27,5% 17,7% 140,4% 9,2% 29,3% 5,9% 5,3% 4,1% 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013 
downloaded: 2014-03-09 
 
One of the Maastricht criteria states that the inflation rate is an annual refer-
ence period shall not exceed the greater of 1.5% of the average of the three Member 
States with the lowest inflation rate index. In comparison, if we look at how differ-
ent inflation rates over the last eleven years from within the European Monetary Un-
ion (Table 2), we can see that the difference betwen the countries with the lowest 
                                                   
 
2But there are evidence only for its harm to the economy when the inflation is unexpected, double digit 
or higher. 
3Every inflation is basically antisocial (Inotai 2011, p. 361.). 
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and the highest inflation rate is always higher than the 2,2%, resulting in a dramatic 
divergences in a decade. 
Table 2. Inflation in the Euro area from 2002 to 2013 
Geo - time 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Belgium 1,6 1,5 1,9 2,5 2,3 1,8 4,5 0,0 2,3 3,4 2,6 1,2 
Germany 1,4 1,0 1,8 1,9 1,8 2,3 2,8 0,2 1,2 2,5 2,1 1,6 
Estonia 
         
5,1 4,2 3,2 
Ireland 4,7 4,0 2,3 2,2 2,7 2,9 3,1 -1,7 -1,6 1,2 1,9 0,5 
Greece 3,9 3,4 3,0 3,5 3,3 3,0 4,2 1,3 4,7 3,1 1,0 -0,9 
Spain 3,6 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,6 2,8 4,1 -0,2 2,0 3,1 2,4 1,5 
France 1,9 2,2 2,3 1,9 1,9 1,6 3,2 0,1 1,7 2,3 2,2 1,0 
Italy 2,6 2,8 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,0 3,5 0,8 1,6 2,9 3,3 1,3 
Cyprus 
      
4,4 0,2 2,6 3,5 3,1 0,4 
Luxembourg 2,1 2,5 3,2 3,8 3,0 2,7 4,1 0,0 2,8 3,7 2,9 1,7 
Malta 
      
4,7 1,8 2,0 2,5 3,2 1,0 
Netherlands 3,9 2,2 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,6 2,2 1,0 0,9 2,5 2,8 2,6 
Austria 1,7 1,3 2,0 2,1 1,7 2,2 3,2 0,4 1,7 3,6 2,6 2,1 
Portugal 3,7 3,3 2,5 2,1 3,0 2,4 2,7 -0,9 1,4 3,6 2,8 0,4 
Slovenia 
     
3,8 5,5 0,9 2,1 2,1 2,8 1,9 
Slovakia 
       
0,9 0,7 4,1 3,7 1,5 
United King 1,3 1,4 1,3 2,1 2,3 2,3 3,6 2,2 3,3 4,5 2,8 2,6 
Iceland 5,3 1,4 2,3 1,4 4,6 3,6 12,8 16,3 7,5 4,2 6,0 4,1 
Min 1,3 1,0 1,3 1,4 1,7 1,6 2,2 -1,7 -16 1,2 1,0 -0,9 
Max 5,3 4,0 3,2 3,8 4,6 3,8 12,8 16,3 7,5 5,1 6,0 4,1 
Difference 4,0 3,0 1,9 2,4 2,9 2,2 10,6 18,0 9,1 3,9 5,0 5,0 
Source: Eurostat  
2. Different goals, methods, frameworks 
Over much of the 20th century macroeconomic stabilizat on was pursued through 
active discretionary monetary with a fixed exchange rat  regime. 
Disappointed with the excessive focus of economists in controlling business 
cycles, while neglecting the efficiency and growth, Milton Friedman (1948) was the 
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first to articulate a coherent framework of monetary nd fiscal rules. Stated in its 
simplest form, his proposal called for a stable money supply calibrated only to ac-
commodate actual government budget deficits or surpluses generated by a cyclical-
ly-balanced budget, which would of course allow for the operation of automatic sta-
bilizers. Inspired by this proposal, rules-based macroeconomic policy frameworks 
have evolved in multiple ways to capture real-world needs and complexities of dif-
fering economic environments. In essence, a rules-based framework is commitment 
technology. Under such a framework, the fiscal or mnetary authority is bound to 
pursue a predictable policy course, within certain numerical and qualitative con-
straints on a well-defined performance target, such as inflation, public debt, or 
budget balance. As commitment technology, the framework encompasses policy 
rules and procedures that link decision-making to the specified target. The linkages 
include institutional requirements and technical requirements. For instance, in the 
monetary area, inflation targeting is predicated on an effective transmission mecha-
nism between the base interest rate and the inflation rate, possibly specified within a 
coherent macroeconomic model, which underlies inflation forecasts. In the fiscal ar-
ea, policy rules must be supported by an orderly and transparent budget process. The 
latter provide the basis for reliable and unbiased hort- to medium-term fiscal fore-
casts, as well as for long-term scenarios to ascertain public debt sustainability. A key 
element of the framework is a well-defined policy reaction function. The precise 
specification of the interest rate function (simply stated, as a function of the devia-
tion of expected inflation from the target rate and of the output gap) used for infla-
tion targeting is country-specific, yet within a broad pattern across countries (Kopits 
2014). 
When voters have three or more distinct alternatives K nneth Arrow’s para-
dox4 states that no rank order voting system can convert th  ranked preferences of 
individuals into a community-wide ranking while also meeting a specific set of crite-
ria. Political decisions, if they are principled, rest on value judgments. Politicians 
and citizens participating in the political process must choose a position in the con-
flict between such ultimate values. Inflation is a monetary syndrome so that is logic 
we can hope for its curing from a monetary regime.  
A major argument for establishing a rules-based framework is to anchor ex-
pectations of economic agents and financial markets as regards policy goals and pol-
icymaking. Regarding monetary policy the expectations are to be anchored to price 
stability. Anchoring inflation expectations tends to reduce uncertainty and to en-
courage investment, saving and work effort decisions t  be taken from a longer term 
                                                   
 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem. 
Inflation targeting worldwide and in Hungary – a miracle or a disaster? 
 
37 
rather than a short-term perspective, so the reduction of uncertainty tends to lower 
the discount rate. The ensuing decisions contribute to higher economic growth. In-
troduction of a rules-based framework can be particularly useful for signaling a par-
adigm shift in a country where macroeconomic policy management has experienced 
erosion in credibility. If accompanied by much-needd structural reforms (rationaliz-
ing government employment, targeting subsidies and pensions, eliminating tax dis-
tortions, etc.), such policy signaling can initiate  virtuous economic cycle by induc-
ing a decline in the sovereign risk premium, followed by a boost in economic activi-
ty, and culminating in an increased growth path (Kopits 2014). 
The following monetary regimes exist (Table 3): 
- Monetary targeting; 
- Exchange rate targeting; 
- Real exchange rate targeting; 
- Inflation targeting; 
- Hybrid; 
- No strategy-strategy. 
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In some respects, the European Union represents a special case of a monetary 
union with a highly decentralized system of subnational governments. 
Although good practices have evolved in shaping rules-based frameworks, 
there is no universal standard applicable worldwide. In fact, it is hard to find two 
countries that have the same framework, even in terms of design, but especially in 
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practice. Whereas there is some convergence toward a standard template in the de-
sign and implementation of an inflation targeting re ime (Kopits 2014). 
3. Inflation Targeting worldwide 
It is now widely accepted that the primary role of monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability. An operating definition of price stability that is now broadly accepted 
has been offered by Alan Greenspan “Price stability obtains when economic agents 
no longer take account of the prospective change in the general price level in their 
economic decision making” (2009). This is often thought to correspond to an an ual 
rate of inflation in the low single digits. Inflation targeting is one of the operational 
frameworks for monetary policy aimed at attaining price stability. In contrast to al-
ternative strategies, notably money or exchange rate targeting, which seek to achieve 
low and stable inflation through targeting intermediate variables – for example, the 
growth rate of money aggregates or the level of the exchange rate of an “anchor” 
currency – Inflation Targeting involves targeting iflation directly. The literature of-
fers several different definitions of inflation targeting. In practice, however, inflation 
targeting has two main characteristics that distinguish it from other monetary policy 
strategies: 
1. The central bank is mandated, and commits to, a unique numerical target 
in the form of a level or a range for annual inflation. A single target for in-
flation emphasizes the fact that price stabilization is the primary focus of 
the strategy, and the numeric specification provides a guide to what the au-
thorities intend as price stability. 
2. The inflation forecast over some horizon is the de facto intermediate target 
of policy. For this reason inflation targeting is sometimes referred to as 
“ inflation forecast targeting”. Since inflation is partially predetermined in 
the short term because of existing price and wage contracts and/or indexa-
tion to past inflation, monetary policy can only influence expected future 
inflation. By altering monetary conditions in response to new information, 
central banks influence expected inflation and bring it in line over time 
with the inflation target, which eventually leads actual inflation to the tar-
get (IMF 2005, pp. 161-162.). 
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Table 4. Inflation target worldwide 
Country Inflation targeting adoption date 
New Zealand 1990 
Canada 1991 
United Kingdom 1992 
Australia 1993 
Sweden 1993 























Source: Sarwat (2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm 
 
Mishkin says that there are 5 major characteristics of this monetary regime, 
which are the follows: “Inflation targeting is a recent monetary policy strategy that 
encompasses five main elements: 1) the public announcement of medium-term nu-
merical targets for inflation; 2) an institutional commitment to price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals re subordinated; 3) an in-
formation inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just monetary aggre-
gates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy instruments; 4) 
increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy hrough communication with 
the public and the markets about the plans, objectiv s, and decisions of the monetary 
authorities; and 5) increased accountability of the central bank for attaining its infla-
tion objectives. Inflation targeting requires that a decision be made on what price 
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stability means in practice. Alan Greenspan has provided a widely-cited definition of 
price stability as a rate of inflation that is sufficiently low that households and busi-
nesses do not have to take it into account in making everyday decisions. This defini-
tion of price stability is a reasonable one and operationally, any inflation number be-
tween zero and 3% seems to meet this criterion (Mishkin 2001, p. 2.)”.  
Inflation Targeting has become an increasingly popular monetary policy strat-
egy, with many countries now inflation targeters. After New Zealand had introduced 
Inflation Targeting were 27 other countries that adopted it, fixing the consumer price 
index as their monetary policy goal (Table 4). The government outsources the deci-
sion-making to an independent central bank which in tur  is accountable to the gov-
ernment, the legislature, and the public. Performance under the inflation target is 
continuously monitored and communicated by the central bank (including through 
quarterly inflation reports); also, deviations from the inflation target must be ex-
plained (Kopits 2014). 
3.1. What to do with IT in good times? 
It is well documented that, by and large, performance under rules-based monetary 
frameworks has been favorable. Inflation targeting, whether explicit or implicit, 
conducted by independent central banks, has contributed significantly to an almost 
uninterrupted record of low inflation in more than three dozen countries around the 
world. Arguably, this record was helped significantly by tailwinds during the Great 
Moderation. Integration of the Asian workforce into the world labor market and IT-
based productivity gains in industrial countries have been major drivers, which al-
lowed a rather loose monetary stance (and complacency) in some countries. The ex-
perience has been particularly beneficial in emerging market economies, where in-
flation targeting has served as a useful disinflation device from double-digit rates 
Most of the inflation targeters had poor initial conditions prior to the adapta-
tion of Inflation Targeting regime (see Table 5). Table 5 represents a cross-country – 
in Emerging and Industrial countries – analysis (data source International Monetary 
Fund 2005, p. 178.).  
However, in recent years, inflation targeting regimes in many of these coun-
tries have been under pressure from strong capital inflows associated with extraordi-
nary liquidity expansion in the advanced economies (Kopits 2014). 
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Table 5. Initial conditions prior to adopting Inflation Targeting  









Emerging Countries    
Philippines 25% 29% 50% 13% 
Israel 42% 22% 29% 48% 
Czech Republic 33% 23% 60% 26% 
Peru 8% 25% 83% 27% 
Hungary 25% 50% 15% 53% 
Korea 42% 44% 32% 29% 
Brazil 25% 54% 56% 26% 
Chile 25% 43% 67% 28% 
Thailand 8% 57% 57% 44% 
Poland 25% 42% 65% 35% 
Colombia 25% 41% 63% 39% 
South Africa 33% 64% 64% 53% 
Mexico 58% 41% 68% 48% 
Industrial Countries    
New-Zeeland 67% 43% 14% 28% 
Iceland 58% 43% 33% 39% 
Australia 67% 56% 57% 52% 
Norway 58% 56% 64% 55% 
Canada 100% 41% 48% 53% 
United Kingdom 92% 62% 44% 53% 
Sweden 92% 55% 66% 41% 
Switzerland 58% 68% 77% 56% 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2005, p. 178.) 
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3.2. What to do with IT in the times of financial crises? 
„Today inflation targeting is been put to the test – and it will almost certainly fail” 
(Stiglitz 2008). The governors of different central b nks of major advanced econo-
mies decided to reach certain overarching goals, which are the follows: (1) lower 
unemployment to a 6.5 % rate in the United States, (2) to save the euro in the Euro-
pean Union, and (3) to end deflation in Japan. Faced with zero-bound interest rates, 
central banks adopted “forward guidance,” as a form f rule, in the implementation 
of quantitative easing programs (Woodford 2012). 
In the European Union, the one-size-fits-all monetary policy in the euro area 
has been less than successful and the Stability and Growth Pact has failed upon im-
plementation (Kopits 2014). 
The other critics of IT Inflation targeting in transition economies has been a 
more challenging task than in developed economies (Daianu–Lungu 2005, Freed-
man–Ötker-Robe 2009, Rose 2007, Walsh 2009a, 2009b). As experience with IT in 
transition economies shows, the central banks in these countries often missed infla-
tion targets by a sensible amount.5 „The country experiences support the earlier ar-
guments that countries do not have to satisfy a long ist of preconditions at the outset 
to implement the IT framework successfully. Among the sample countries, only one 
(Canada) was well-positioned to move to a full-fledg  IT regime at the time that it 
adopted the policy framework. In others, while some of the so-called preconditions 
were met, a number of them were missing and were established gradually over time 
after the adoption of IT (Freedman–Ötker-Robe 2009, p. 6.)”, see also on Table 6.  
After a brief period following the transition, all Visegrád countries (V4) opted 
for an inflation targeting regime, later Romania also introduced IT. In Table 7 we 
can state that out of 32 trials only 14 times (with green color) were reached the tar-
get in Czech Republic and in Poland between 1998 and 2013.  
 
                                                   
 
5 Also criticize IT the following economists: Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley 
Mohamed El-Erian, PIMCO Arminio Fraga, Gavea Investimentos, Takatoshi Ito, University of Tokyo, 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Bruegel, Eswar Prasad, Cornell University and Brookings Institution, Raghuram 
Rajan, University of Chicago, Maria Ramos, Absa Group Ltd., Carmen Reinhart, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Hélène Rey, London Business School, Dani Rodrik, Harvard University, 
Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University, Hyun Song Shin, Princeton University, Andrés Velasco, 
Columbia University, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, University of Mainz, Yongding Yu, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences 
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Table 6. Main Elements of Successful Inflation Targeting Implementation 
Conditions  Countries satisfying 
Price stability as the primary 
goal of monetary policy  
Romania and Turkey 
Price stability main objective 
with other goals  
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic; Hungary, Israel and Poland (with 
exchange rate bands) 
Goal independence or agree-
ment with the government on 
inflation target path 
Israel (government set the target); Canada, Czech Republic, Hunga-
ry, and Turkey (joint between government and CB); Chile, and Po-
land (CB) 
Absence of fiscal dominance 
(gov. access to CB credit lim-
ited/ prohibited) 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, 
and Turkey 
Central bank instrument inde-
pendence 
Canada (de facto) Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, 
Romania, and Turkey 
Well-understood transmission 
mechanism 
Relatively good in Canada (though with gaps); Basic at outset, with 
continuing efforts in: Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Po-
land, Romania, and Turkey 
Reasonable degree of control 
over short-term interest rates 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, and Turkey. Hungary, Israel, and 
Poland (though reasonable, it was complicated somewhat by simul-
taneous pursuit of the ER target) 
Reasonably well-developed fi-
nancial markets 
Canada and Chile (well-developed) Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel 
(relatively well-developed), Turkey, Poland, and Romania (less well-
developed) 
Reasonably stable financial sys-
tem 
Canada, Chile, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Romania, and Turkey 
Modeling/forecasting capacity 
Canada (well-developed). In the remaining countries--little at the 
start, developed and improved over time. 
Mechanisms of accountability  
Canada (no formal accountability mechanism at the outset, but need 
to explain monetary policy to public; formal mechanisms established 
over time); Turkey (through requirement to inform the public about 
CB operations and monetary policy and when targets were not met at 
the designated time). 
Source: Freedman–Ötker-Robe (2009, p. 6.) 
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Table 7. Inflation Targeting Systems in Czech Republic and in Poland between 1998 
and 2013 
Czech Republic Poland 
Target Actual Target Actual 
1998 5,5-6,5% 10,70% N/A 11,80% 
1999 4-5% 2,10% 6,4-7,8% 7,30% 
2000 3,5-5,5% 3,80% 5,4-6,8% 10,10% 
2001 2-4% 4,68% 6-8% 5,50% 
2002 2,75-4,75% 1,88% 4-6% 1,90% 
2003 2,5-4,5% 0,11% 2-4% 0,80% 
2004 2-4% 2,78% 1,5-3,5% 3,49% 
2005 2-4% 1,84% 1,5-3,5% 2,13% 
2006 2-4% 2,54% 1,5-3,5% 1,03% 
2007 2-4% 2,86% 1,5-3,5% 2,49% 
2008 2-4% 6,34% 1,5-3,5% 4,22% 
2009 2-4% 1,03% 1,5-3,5% 3,45% 
2010 2-4% 1,46% 1,5-3,5% 2,58% 
2011 2-4% 1,93% 1,5-3,5% 4,27% 
2012 2-4% 3,29% 1,5-3,5% 3,70% 
2013 2-4% 1,42% 1,5-3,5% 0,90% 
Source: IMF  
 
Contrary to the criticism that rules-based frameworks are too rigid, well-
designed frameworks are sufficiently flexible to compensate for economic shocks. 
Indeed, inflation targeting can be constructed to all w explicitly or implicitly, in 
some cases automatically, for compensatory offsets to output shocks. For example, 
inflation targets can be formulated in implicit terms or within a band or (under the 
Taylor rule) with a dual mandate by including the output gap as an additional deter-
minant (Kopits 2014). 
4. IT in Hungary 
Table 3 showed that Hungary is using an IT monetary regime. The central bank law 
states that the main goal of the Hungarian National Bank is to reach and sustain the 
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price stability. For this purpose there has been introduced the inflation targeting 
monetary framework (IT) since 2001.6 The Hungarian National Bank with the gov-
ernment has a middle-term inflation rate goal, which is equal 3% of the official-, 
Central Statistic Office measured average consumer price index. The MNB said that 
this measure is consistent with the price stability, although many leader economists 
suggest that price stability may be 4% or above (seBlanchard et al. 2010, p. 11.). 
Figure 1 and Table 8. show the Hungarian IT’s results.  
Figure 1. CPI and Inflation Targeting in Hungary  
 
Source: Hungarian National Bank  
 
We can see that the IT has not been successful in Hungary. “The practical im-
plications of long-term optimal inflation in Hungary are, to a certain extent, limited 
by the fact that the medium/long-term inflation target should meet the criteria of 
adopting the euro. In order to join the euro area, Hungary must reduce inflation to a 
level consistent with the relevant convergence criterion (Kiss–Krekó 2004, p. 4.).” 
                                                   
 
6 Before 2001 there used to be the preannounced crawling exchange rate peg framework.  
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Table 8. Inflation and targets in Hungary 
Year Inflation Target 
2001 6,8% 5,8% 
2002 4,8% 3,5%-5,5% 
2003 5,7% 2,5%-4,5% 
2004 6,1% 2,5%-4,5% 
2005 3,3% 3%-5% 
2006 6,5% 2,5%-4,5% 
2007 8,0% 3,0% 
2008 6,0% 3,0% 
2009 4,2% 3,0% 
2010 4,9% 3,0% 
2011 3,9% 3,0% 
2012 5,7% 3,0% 
2013 1,7% 3,0% 
Source: MNB and KSH 
5. Hungarian monetary policy and the financial crisis 
Just like the other economies in the region, in autumn 2008 the Hungarian economy 
was hit by several extremely severe shocks at the same time. Firstly, the immediate 
impact to the real economy caused by the collapse of d mand in the export markets. 
Secondly, the liquidity shock as the entire economy was shaken by the sudden short-
age of foreign-currency and forint liquidity. Since monetary policy could only re-
spond to this upheaval tardily, and inefficiently due to reasons of principle and tech-
nical factors, all scope for budgetary-policy intervention was lost. It is an undispta-
ble fact that Hungary had already lost the means of applying an anti-cyclical budget-
ary policy – by actively increasing the deficit during the crisis – in the years preced-
ing the crisis. As a consequence of the grossly irresponsible economic (primarily 
budgetary) policies of previous years, unlike in neighboring countries, fiscal policy 
was unable or barely able to mitigate the terrible impacts of the crisis. 
The financing of the budget – except in countries with reserve currencies – 
has temporarily run into difficulties in many other countries, due to the general dry-
ing up of local money and capital markets. But in these countries assertive and con-
fident action by central banks, which often had no qualms about deploying unortho-
dox methods, succeeded in perceptibly dampening down the market tension related 
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to the financing of the government securities market. A necessary prerequisite for 
this, but not the only one, was that the central banks possess sufficient foreign ex-
change reserves to provide temporarily, over the short term, an adequate buffer to 
absorb the increased domestic demand for foreign currency, and to partly make up 
for the drop in foreign currency inflow, to meet payment obligations and fulfil con-
version requests; in other words, making it possible to avoid the currency exchange 
rate going into freefall and benchmark interest rates from rising sharply and sudden-
ly. For this reason, these countries were only forced to seek outside assistance con-
siderably later.  
The Hungarian economy was in a terrible shape when t  international finan-
cial turmoil reached the country due to its relatively high level of external indebted-
ness, the high public debt, the overly extensive and badly-structured fiscal redistri-
bution of funds, the extremely rapid and unfavourably-structured growth in forint 
and foreign-currency lending and the significantly overvalued forint, the high posi-
tive real interest rates. Figure 2 shows the base rte of that era.  
Figure 2. The base rate under Governor Simor  
 
Source: MNB data with my own figuring  
 
If we analyze the rate decisions of the Monetary Council we can state that un-
der the era of Governor Simor’s there were altogether 74 rate decision (see Figure 
4). 42 times out of it there were neither base rate rising, nor base rate decreasing. 23 
times were base rate decreasing and only 9 times decided the Monetary Council to 
raise the base rate. For a few drama-filled days in autumn 2008 the central bank 
raised the reference rate by 300 basis points (see in Figure 3), the only central bank 
in the region to do so with good reason.  
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Figure 3. Interest rate decisions of the MNB Monetary Council 
 
Source: MNB data with my own figuring 
 
Due to the shortage of sufficient foreign exchange reserves there wasn’t any 
monetary action in the currency market in this sever  times. The low international 
reserves prevented the central bank from performing one of its basic functions. Even 
over a short, 3-6-month horizon, the central bank was incapable of guaranteeing the 
liquidity of the Hungarian financial system without any major hitches; in other 
words it was only partially able to fulfil its role as the ‘lender of last resort’. Over 
and above the technical restriction caused by the shortage of reserves, however, 
weighty matters of principle also led to the MNB being far less prepared for the cri-
sis than its foreign counterparts. For many years prior to the crisis, the MNB be-
lieved in the self-regulating nature of the financial markets, and in their efficiency. It 
assigned itself the role of ‘night watchman’, and rejected out of hand any approaches 
that ran contrary to this. Before the crisis hit the central bank had not only passed 
over the opportunity to intervene in the currency market (as demonstrated by the 
strengthening of the forint exchange rate to HUF 228/EUR in the spring of 2008), 
but also declined to quote FX swaps (exchanges of foreign currency and forint de-
posits) and thus forewent the ability to influence liquidity, just as it had refused to 
take part in open-market transactions and actively shape market liquidity and market 
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expectations. After the agreement was concluded with the IMF, it was no longer so 
much the technical limitation that prevented the MNB from being active and coura-
geous, innovative and prepared to make wide use of unconventional means and react 
with the appropriate degree of flexibility, but rather its inability to step out of its 
own shadow. 
First and foremost, a fundamental change of principles and approach was 
needed, similar to the one that has taken place widly around the world as a result of 
the crisis. Despite an awareness of the substantial expansion in liquidity in the offing 
from the international financial institutions, there was no fundamental rethinking of 
the monetary-policy frameworks (Surányi 2010). 
A significant relaxation of monetary policy would have undermined the forint 
exchange rage, thereby letting inflation and inflation expectations off the leash. In 
January 2009 the central bank gave off signals and ma e decisions that pointed in 
the direction of a dangerous, across-the-board monetary loosening. The unfortunate 
central bank communication regarding the exchange rat  at the beginning of the 
year, and the further ill-advised interest-rate cuts, seemed to suggest that the central 
bank’s policy was shifting from one extreme (the forcing of a strong forint) to the 
other (preference for a weak forint (Surányi 2010). 
In an inflation targeting framework, the FX rate “in theory” floats freely. In 
the other group of countries, pegged or quasi-fix FX regimes are operated. The final 
goal of monetary policy is obviously to facilitate price stability. In text book cases, 
the most important tool of the central bank is setting he domestic interest rates in 
order to reach price stability and control inflation. This is true in theory and in big, 
closed economies. The effectiveness of the IT regims is subject to heated debates 
even in big, closed, developed economies, while in the small, open economies of the 
CEE region the track record of the IT systems is very poor. A long series of empiri-
cal studies have already proved that the interest rate channel in these countries is 
much weaker than the FX-rate channel. One can believe in the IT systems or not, but 
it can not be disputed, that the only effective tool of the central bank is the FX rate –
in a small, open economy. Hence, a central bank operating under an IT system, in 
practice should target the FX rate and adjust its interest rate level to the “implicit” 
FX target that is consistent with the inflation goal (Surányi 2009, 2010).  
6. Conclusions 
The fact that the inflation target has not been constantly achieved in Hungary, it 
does not in mean that the IT regime (which is much more than a public definition of 
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the inflation target) itself is unsuccessful. Many countries did not satisfy the precon-
ditions, difficulties in establishing credibility.  
A major argument for establishing a rules-based framework is to anchor ex-
pectations of economic agents and financial markets as regards policy goals and pol-
icymaking. Regarding monetary policy the expectations are to be anchored to price 
stability. Anchoring inflation expectations tends to reduce uncertainty and to en-
courage investment, saving and work effort decisions t  be taken from a longer term 
rather than a short-term perspective, so the reduction of uncertainty tends to lower 
the discount rate. The ensuing decisions contribute to higher economic growth.  
One can believe in the IT systems or not, but it can not be disputed, that the 
only effective tool of the central bank is the FX rate –in a small, open economy. 
Hence, a central bank operating under an IT system, in practice should target the FX 
rate and adjust its interest rate level to the “impl cit” FX target that is consistent with 
the inflation goal. Hungary is a role model to show the need of a rethinking Inflation 
targeting framework.  
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